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THE RULE OF REASON AND THE GOALS
OF ANTITRUST: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
ROGER D. BLAIR
D. DANIEL SOKOL*
Since its inception, the Sherman Act’s broad language has required judicial
interpretation to separate lawful and unlawful conduct under its terms. It is
one thing to broadly proscribe collusion and monopolizing behavior, but quite
another to apply these broad prohibitions in specific circumstances. Over
time, as the Supreme Court interpreted the Sherman Act, certain practices
became unlawful per se. A plaintiff—public or private—had only to prove the
fact of the conduct to prevail because the deleterious effects of that conduct
were presumed without further inquiry. Business conduct that was not pre-
sumptively unlawful was evaluated under the rule of reason to determine
whether, on balance, the conduct at issue should be condemned.
Some of the per se treatment deserved the per se label, and some did not.
For practices with categorically unambiguous competitive effects, antitrust
per se rules are appropriate.1 As our economic understanding of some conduct
has improved, some per se rules have been abandoned and replaced by rule of
reason analysis.2 Supreme Court opinions that went too far in condemning
practices that might be procompetitive or competitively neutral have been the
* Department of Economics, University of Florida, and Faculty of Law, University of Flor-
ida, respectively. The authors have benefited from the advice of several colleagues: H.E. Frech,
III, Jeffrey Harrison, Jill Herndon, Herbert Hovenkamp, Keith Hylton, and John Lopatka. Jessica
Haynes made valuable contributions to an earlier draft.
1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 115–16 (2005).
2 ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN
PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 358 (2002) (noting that
after the Sylvania decision “the Court systematically went about the task of dismantling many of
the per se rules it had created in the prior fifty years, and increasingly turned to modern eco-
nomic theory to inform its interpretation and application of the Sherman Act”). As a corollary,
the move to a rule of reason analysis has resulted in higher litigation costs because of the com-
plexities involved in the use of that standard. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63
TEX. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1984).
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subject of much scholarly criticism.3 In many instances, the lower courts un-
dermined the force of those unfortunate precedents by drawing the proverbial
“distinction without a difference.”4 This set of conflicting lower court deci-
sions finally attracted the Supreme Court’s attention.
We have witnessed the Court’s reconsideration of several unfortunate
precedents and the consequential demise of per se rules involving boycotts,5
vertical price restraints,6 and vertical non-price restraints.7 Today, the courts
analyze each of these practices under the rule of reason.
It is important to identify the goal of antitrust so a rule of reason analysis
can proceed in a consistent and logical fashion.8 The rule of reason involves
more open-ended inquiry than that of a per se analysis, moving antitrust away
from rules and toward a standard. It is important, therefore, to have a clear
statement of the welfare standard to be employed in promoting the goal of
antitrust policy under a rule of reason analysis. In the absence of clear gui-
dance from the Supreme Court, it is left to the discretion of the lower courts
which of two standards—consumer welfare or total welfare—will be
followed.
3 Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Errands into the Wilderness
3–7 (Univ. of Iowa Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 09-16, 2009) (describing the evolution in
antitrust thinking in academia, the antitrust agencies, and the courts).
4 See, e.g., Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1978) (describing the mean-
ingless distinction made by the Court in Schwinn); see also Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358
(7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.) (offering a tongue-in-cheek refusal to undermine an unwise Supreme
Court precedent).
5 See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985)
(correcting a popular misconception that boycotts were illegal per se); see also FTC v. Ind. Fed’n
of Dentists, 476 U.S. 477 (1986) (declining to treat the refusal to deal as per se unlawful); Joseph
P. Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deal: A Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 685 (1979) (criticizing the per se treatment of boycotts).
6 With respect to maximum resale pricing, State Oil Co. v. Khan, 552 U.S. 3 (1997), over-
ruled Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). See generally Roger D. Blair & John. E.
Lopatka, Albrecht Overruled—at Last, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 537 (1998) (providing a legal and
economic analysis of maximum resale pricing); Roger D. Blair & John E. Lopatka, The Albrecht
Rule After Khan: Death Becomes Her, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 123 (1998) (same). With respect
to minimum resale price restraints, Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877 (2007), overruled Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373
(1911). See generally Symposium, Antitrust Analysis of Resale Price Maintenance After Leegin,
55 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (2010) (describing the controversy spawned by the Leegin decision).
7 With respect to non-price vertical restraints, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1978), overruled United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). See
Robert Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 171 (celebrating the
Sylvania decision).
8 In our view, there can be only a single goal if one values consistency and logic. We make
the case for total welfare as the single goal of antitrust.
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Robert Bork noted that to effectively implement antitrust law, its goals
must be determined.9 This guidance is especially important when analyzing
conduct under the rule of reason. As we discuss in this article, the goal of
antitrust has not been articulated clearly by the Supreme Court. This lack of
clear guidance has led to uncertain and inconsistent outcomes under the rule
of reason both at the Supreme Court and lower court levels.
The goal of antitrust, as understood by economic analysis, involves a
choice of either total welfare or consumer welfare. Total welfare reflects the
overall economic surplus from both producers and consumers. In contrast,
consumer welfare refers to the surplus that goes only to consumers and does
not include producer surplus. Though this distinction may be clear in the ab-
stract, the problem is in its implementation by the courts. As we will explore,
the ambiguity arose as a result of Bork’s use of the term “consumer welfare”
when he meant total welfare.10 Not understanding this distinction, the Su-
preme Court quoted Bork when it suggested that the Sherman Act is a “con-
sumer welfare prescription.”11 Consequently, when courts today use the term
“consumer welfare,” it is unclear if the term’s meaning is literal or if it is
being used as Bork intended.
From an economic perspective, the rule of reason inquiry should center on
total welfare. If a defendant’s conduct reduces total welfare, it would be
deemed “unreasonable” and, therefore, should be unlawful; if it does not re-
duce total welfare, it would not be deemed unreasonable and, therefore,
should be lawful. We propose using the Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle
to evaluate the impact of various business practices on total welfare.12 This
approach provides an economically sound methodology for separating objec-
tionable and unobjectionable behavior.
In Part I, we review the Supreme Court’s guidance on the standard for
conducting a rule of reason analysis. Put simply, the Supreme Court has failed
to identify clearly what standard to use. While a case can be made for total
welfare as the guiding principle, which is the standard that we advocate, an
9 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 50 (1978)
[hereinafter ANTITRUST PARADOX].
10 Id. at 66, 97 (arguing that antitrust law should adopt what Bork terms a “consumer welfare”
standard for illegality, but then equating this standard with “total welfare,” as that term is under-
stood in economics).
11 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX,
supra note 9, at 66).
12 See RICHARD E. JUST, DARRELL L. HUETH & ANDREW SCHMITZ, THE WELFARE ECONOMICS
OF PUBLIC POLICY: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO PROJECT AND POLICY EVALUATION 32–38
(2004) [hereinafter WELFARE ECONOMICS] (discussing the Kaldor-Hicks compensation princi-
ple); see also John Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939);
Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions in Economic and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility,
49 ECON. J. 549 (1939).
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argument also can be made, based upon case law, for consumer welfare. Al-
though the term “consumer welfare” dominates at both the Supreme Court
and lower court levels,13 a comprehensive reading of the case law suggests
that the Court has alternatively suggested either the consumer welfare or total
welfare as the correct standard.
In most simple cases, the antitrust welfare standard does not matter. Be-
yond these simple cases, however, there are more complicated cases for which
the welfare standard does matter. The welfare standard matters precisely be-
cause one cannot undertake a rule of reason analysis without knowing what
standard to apply. Because the rule of reason analysis within antitrust case law
has expanded over the past forty years, the need to have a consistent and
logical analysis of rule of reason is more important than ever before.
This article introduces the first set of complicated cases where the standard
matters in Part II, where we discuss the efficiency trade-off. Next is Part III,
in which we analyze the countervailing efficiencies that are accompanied by
increased market power flowing from joint ventures or mergers. We also turn
our attention to mergers or agreements that turn a monopoly (or a monopsony)
into a bilateral monopoly, another instance in which the welfare standard af-
fects whether the particular arrangement should be condemned under the rule
of reason. In Part IV, we analyze restraints that have no apparent effect on
total welfare but do have pronounced distributive effects. Finally, we close the
article with comments in Part V on how to solve the policy dilemma of the
implementation of a proper goal of antitrust.
I. THE RULE OF REASON IN ANTITRUST
The rule of reason in antitrust law has its foundations in common law. The
common law, however, employs a rule of reason analysis that weighs a wider
range of total costs and benefits in resolving legal conflicts than is considered
under the antitrust laws. As Keith Hylton points out: “The modern rule of
reason in antitrust is a narrower test, in the sense that it examines a narrower
set of issues.”14 With the demise of many per se rules in antitrust, it has be-
come increasingly important to understand more fully the scope of the rule of
reason in antitrust.
For this, one naturally turns to the Supreme Court for instruction. In partic-
ular, we seek guidance on the goal of antitrust: to promote total welfare, con-
sumer welfare, or some other objective. Beyond that, we also seek guidance
on the scope of the costs and benefits that are cognizable in an antitrust rule of
13 See Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and Consumer Welfare in Antitrust (Aug. 3,
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1873463 [hereinafter Distributive Justice].
14 KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW EVOLUTION
116 (2003).
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reason inquiry.15 The Court, however, has not been as helpful as one might
wish since the Chicago revolution.
It is clear that the rule of reason is aimed at determining the competitive
effects of a business practice under review. In order to implement the rule of
reason, however, it is necessary to know what “value” or “values” the antitrust
laws should promote.16 Although some support can be found for other val-
ues,17 the most prominent are consumer welfare and total welfare. In many, if
not most, circumstances, judgments on reasonableness will be invariant across
these two goals. There are, however, restraints that may be reasonable on total
welfare grounds but unreasonable on consumer welfare grounds. Conse-
quently, it is important to identify the policy goal being pursued.
One factor that motivates the study of the appropriate welfare standard has
been the continued divergence within the academy and case law on the stan-
dard. Posner, however, suggests that there is a single belief on this standard:
Almost everyone professionally involved in antitrust today—whether as liti-
gator, prosecutor, judge, academic, or informed observer—not only agrees
that the only goal of the antitrust laws should be to promote economic wel-
fare, but also agrees on the essential tenets of economic theory that should
be used to determine the consistency of specific business practices with that
goal.18
In Posner’s formulation, this goal is based upon a total welfare calcula-
tion.19 Though Posner is correct in stating the majority position, it is interest-
15 In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority, appeared to limit the inquiry to costs and benefits in the market
in which the restraint occurs, i.e., the Court relied on a partial equilibrium analysis. This means
that effects—good and bad—in related markets are irrelevant to the inquiry. If, for example,
there were a restraint in the beef market, the impact in the markets for substitutes (chicken, pork,
tofu) or the markets for complements (potatoes, condiments) would not be considered. Nor
would the impacts in the input markets (cattle, labor) be considered. Professional Engineers’
narrowing of the inquiry clearly makes it more manageable, but it does not necessarily yield the
socially optimal results from an economic perspective. This, of course, assumes that we do not
consider non-market effects and externalities. See Richard M. Brunell, The Social Costs of Merg-
ers: Restoring “Local Control” as a Factor in Merger Policy, 85 N.C. L. REV. 149 (2006);
Christopher R. Leslie, Achieving Efficiency Through Collusion: A Market Failure Defense to
Horizontal Price-Fixing, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 243 (1993).
16 See Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7
(1966) [hereinafter Legislative Intent].
17 See, e.g., Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement, in THE PARANOID
STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1965); WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN
AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT (1965); RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ,
COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888–1992 (1996); HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTI-
TRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION (1955); Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The
Origins of Antitrust: An Interest-Group Perspective, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 73 (1985).
18 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW ix (2d ed. 2001).
19 Id. at 23–24.
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ing to note that his position has been taken primarily by economists and law
professors who draw from the Chicago School heritage.20
The Supreme Court has left ambiguous whether consumer or total welfare
should be used as the appropriate standard. Many of the Court’s opinions are
confusing because of the effects of Bork’s powerful influence.21 In 1966, Bork
analyzed the legislative intent of the Sherman Act.22 He argued that economic
efficiency should be the guiding principle, which means total welfare, but he
called this “consumer welfare.” This was a poor choice of words. Over 100
court cases today cite to Bork explicitly when referring to the “consumer wel-
fare” goal of the antitrust laws, making it difficult to know precisely what the
court means when it refers to “consumer welfare.”23 These cases range from
Supreme Court cases (most recently Leegin24) to lower court decisions.
The desire to promote consumer welfare over total welfare has been made
on democratic grounds25 and on similar grounds of supporting the political
bargain of antitrust.26 For example, Robert Lande has argued for a consumer
welfare standard as a tie-breaker when there is a difference between consumer
and total welfare. In his earliest work on the topic he argued for legal rules in
mergers that would “incorporat[e] both efficiency and distributive considera-
tions into the formulation of merger guidelines.”27 In some circumstances, this
is without problem. In others, wealth distribution would assume primacy
20 See e.g., MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY, THEORY AND PRACTICE (2004); Robert
H. Bork, The Goals of Antitrust Policy, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 242 (May 1967); Dennis W. Carlton,
Does Antitrust Need to Be Modernized?, 21 J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2007, at 155; Kenneth G.
Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125
U. PA. L. REV. 1191 (1977); Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, The Economics of Welfare
Standards in Antitrust, 2 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 3 (2006); Alan J. Meese, Debunking the
Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total
Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659 (2010); Richard A.
Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 932 (1979); Donald F. Turner,
The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1207,
1208–09 (1969).
21 Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
133, 134–35 (2011).
22 Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 16.
23 A Westlaw search in the “ALLFEDS” and “SCT” databases finds that there are 18 Supreme
Court cases and 180 total federal court cases that cited to Bork’s Antitrust Paradox. Most of
these cases, however, do not seem to appreciate the context in which Bork wrote.
24 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
25 John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting
Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 237 (2008).
26 Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy as a Political Bargain, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 486
(2006). We do not believe that consumer welfare is necessarily merely distributive. Once a court
chooses a consumer welfare standard, it tries to maximize consumer surplus within the consumer
welfare approach (but remains willing to sacrifice productive efficiency).
27 Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern for Antitrust: The
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 148–49 (1982).
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based upon Congressional intent.28 Lande also combines small business pro-
tection and consumer welfare goals, although he notes the primacy of con-
sumer welfare in this calculation.29
Based on the somewhat ambiguous instructions from the Supreme Court, it
is unclear whether a rule of reason inquiry should focus on consumer welfare
or on total welfare. This lack of clarity did not need to be the case. Had the
Court consistently followed the economic logic of Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc, we would not have the ambiguity that exists today.30 Jus-
tice White’s concurring opinion characterizes the position of the Court in Syl-
vania as “view[ing] the Sherman Act as directed solely to economic
efficiency . . . .”31 Since White cited Bork when referring to economic effi-
ciency, one may infer that he meant total welfare.
Unfortunately, the Court subsequently decided Brunswick32 that very year
using a different logic from what it had set out in Sylvania. In his Brunswick
opinion, Justice Marshall discussed the Congressional intent of the Sherman
Act.33 The plaintiff in Brunswick sought treble damages for injustices that
flowed from enhanced lawful competition provided by Brunswick. Marshall
pointed out that awarding lost profits to the competitor was not in the spirit of
the antitrust laws. Marshall found support for this position in the legislative
debates on treble damages. In these debates, the legislative history suggested
that the trebling of damages provided individual consumers with a remedy
against the anticompetitive behavior of firms. Thus, Brunswick seems to favor
a consumer welfare standard. Our inference here is somewhat tentative, how-
ever, because Brunswick dealt with cognizable damages rather than the law-
fulness of Brunswick’s business practices.
Two years later, in Reiter,34 the central issue was whether consumers had
standing to sue for overcharge damages. Following Sylvania, the Court cited
Bork’s consumer welfare standard. In this case, however, it is much less clear
28 Id. at 151. This interpretation of the legislative history is not uniform. Bork argued that the
Sherman Act was based on efficiency. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 9, at 66. Some
scholars, however, reject this view as not supported by the legislative history. See Orbach, supra
note 21, at 136 (providing a literature review). Hovenkamp has argued, instead, that the legisla-
tive history of the Sherman Act reflects competitor concerns. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s
Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (1988) (“The principal victims of the trust move-
ment of the 1880s—certainly of the trusts that appeared most frequently on Congress’ hit list—
were inefficient small firms, rather than consumers. Competitors were the principal protected
class of the Sherman Act.”).
29 Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 25, at 210.
30 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
31 Id. at 69.
32 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
33 Id. at 488.
34 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
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that the Court was really concerned with the allocative inefficiency that puts
Bork’s consumer welfare standard in line with a total welfare standard. Most
of the opinion centered on the standing of final consumers under Section 4 of
the Clayton Act. In explaining why consumers of final goods had standing,
the Court observed that:
Respondents engage in speculation in arguing that the substitution of terms
. . . [in § 4 of the Clayton Act] for the broader language originally proposed
by Senator Sherman was clearly intended to exclude pecuniary injuries suf-
fered by those who purchase goods and services at retail for personal
use . . . . On the contrary, they [the Congressional floor debates] suggest that
Congress designed the Sherman Act as a “consumer welfare prescription.”
Certainly the leading proponents of the legislation perceived the treble-dam-
ages remedy of what is now § 4 as a means of protecting consumers from
overcharges resulting from price fixing.35
The second sentence, which incorporates Bork’s consumer welfare prescrip-
tion, has been used to suggest that the Court recognized a total welfare goal.36
The context of its use, however, speaks more to consumer welfare than total
welfare.
Similarly, in the Court’s NCAA opinion,37 a citation to Bork’s consumer
welfare principle is muddled by the Court’s discussion of consumer welfare.
In this case, the University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia
brought suit against the NCAA for fixing the price of telecasts of football
games and limiting the number of games that could be televised. While the
first charge was per se illegal, the limits on the number of games that could be
broadcast were examined under the rule of reason. The Supreme Court fo-
cused on the impact of such restraints on consumers. In particular, the Court
found that “both [price and output] are unresponsive to consumer preference.
This . . . point is perhaps the most significant, since Congress designed the
Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’”38
Likewise, in the Court’s Professional Engineers decision,39 the language
and focus of the opinion are also ambiguous on the question of which welfare
standard the Court intended to employ. The Court did not find it necessary to
consider the actual effects of the restraint on competition, but instead de-
fended the position that competition should determine both the optimal price
35 Id. at 343–44 (citations omitted).
36 Douglas H. Ginsburg, Judge Bork, Consumer Welfare, and Antitrust Law, 31 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 449, 452 (2008).
37 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
38 Id. at 88 (quoting BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 9, at 66). This is actually a
reference to Bork’s total welfare standard, but the discussion is on true consumer welfare.
39 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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and level of product quality. This focus on competition may suggest that the
Court’s intention was to promote total welfare rather than consumer welfare.
In 1986, the Court again had an opportunity to address the role of a profes-
sional association in Indiana Federation of Dentists.40 The opinion similarly
relied on the ability of competition to induce the best possible outcomes. To
some extent, the following statement clarifies what “value” is in play:
A refusal to compete with respect to the package of services offered to cus-
tomers, no less than a refusal to compete with respect to the price term of an
agreement, impairs the ability of the market to advance social welfare by
ensuring the provision of desired goods and services to consumers at a price
approximating the marginal cost of providing them.41
Thus, in Indiana Federation of Dentists, the Supreme Court explicitly ac-
knowledges the importance of total welfare.
Yet, this explicit embrace of total welfare has waned in recent years within
the case law.42 In Weyerhaeuser,43 for instance, the Court discussed issues of
predatory buying and its welfare impact. This decision illustrates that the Su-
preme Court still does not quite understand the difference between welfare
standards. The Court in Weyerhaeuser cites to Bork’s Antitrust Paradox as to
why recoupment is necessary for the predation scheme to make economic
sense. Yet, the decision suggests a literal reading of consumer welfare—the
Weyerhaeuser Court revisited the logic of Brooke Group44 to note that “a
failed predatory-bidding scheme can be a ‘boon to consumers’ in the same
way that we considered a predatory-pricing scheme to be.”45 The Court further
notes that predatory bidding and monopsony may not have an effect on con-
sumers, merely an effect on upstream producers and, for this reason, the same
legal rules that apply to predatory pricing should apply in the predatory buy-
ing context.46
Applying the same rule to predatory pricing and predatory buying would
make sense if the two situations were the same. The economics of predatory
40 FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457 (1986). In this case, the dentists collec-
tively refused to provide information to dental insurers that would be used to assess the appropri-
ateness of the proposed dental care. The dentists argued that such review would impair the
quality of care.
41 Id. at 459 (emphasis added).
42 Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice, supra note 13, at 11.
43 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007).
44 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
45 Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 324–25.
46 Id.; see also J. Thomas Rosch, Monopsony and the Meaning of “Consumer Welfare”: A
Closer Look at Weyerhaeuser, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 353 (2007).
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pricing and predatory buying, however, are not the same.47 By treating preda-
tory pricing and predatory bidding the same way, the Court created a standard
that was underinclusive, effectively allowing a safe harbor for the predatory
buyer. This rule can negatively impact total welfare.48
The Court’s most recent expression of its welfare standard can be found in
Leegin.49 Transcripts of the proceedings, as well as the language of the
Court’s opinion, make it clear that the Court supports a consumer welfare
standard.50 The majority opinion includes an unambiguous statement that the
Sherman Act and antitrust policy are intended to serve the “interests of con-
sumers.”51 It states more fully: “The Sherman Act seeks to maintain a market-
place free of anticompetitive practices . . . . The law assumes that such a
marketplace . . . will tend to bring about the lower prices, better products, and
more efficient production processes that consumers typically desire.”52
Overall, in surveying the Supreme Court’s modern opinions, a crystal clear
identification of antitrust’s goal is as elusive as ever. In the most recent cases,
the Court has shied away from some of its earlier misadventures, such as
protecting small locally owned businesses.53 Instead, the remaining confusion
is choosing between total welfare and consumer welfare as the central goal of
antitrust. The Supreme Court seems to shift between consumer welfare and
total welfare in determining reasonableness. Most of the Court’s opinions ar-
guably favor consumer welfare. Even some opinions that explicitly cite
Bork’s “consumer welfare” principle, which actually means total welfare, fo-
cus on the impact on consumers, suggesting a perspective more consistent
with consumer welfare than with total welfare.
It is difficult to say just what the Court really means due to its misuse of
terms that have precise meaning in economics. The resulting imprecision is
unfortunate because antitrust enforcement would be easier if we fully under-
stood what goal the judiciary is pursuing. As an economic matter, we believe
that the reasonableness of a business practice should be determined by its
47 See Roger D. Blair & John E. Lopatka, Predatory Buying and the Antitrust Laws, 2008
UTAH L. REV. 415 (describing in detail the complexity of predatory buying).
48 ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 77
(2010).
49 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
50 An exchange between Justice Scalia and the plaintiff’s lawyer, Mr. Olson, addresses this
directly. “Justice Scalia: Is it the sole object of the Sherman Act to produce low prices? Mr.
Olson: No. Justice Scalia: I thought it was consumer welfare. Mr. Olson: Yes, yes, it is. Justice
Scalia: And I thought some consumers would prefer more service at a higher price.” Linda
Greenhouse, Justices Hear Arguments About Pacts on Pricing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2007, at
C1.
51 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 904.
52 Id. at 909.
53 See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
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impact on total welfare. But we recognize that a credible case—albeit an im-
perfect one—can be made for consumer welfare. In many cases, using con-
sumer welfare and total welfare lead to the same result. However,
complications and inconsistencies do exist in some cases analyzed under the
rule of reason and related merger law.
II. THE EFFICIENCY TRADE-OFF
In 1968, Oliver Williamson in a path-breaking article discussed the need to
weigh the benefits of improved efficiency against the costs of allocative inef-
ficiency.54 A discussion of the Williamson trade-off is essential to understand-
ing the implications of using a consumer or a total welfare standard given that
that the Williamson trade-off was the very basis of Bork’s efficiency analy-
sis.55 We note that the lessening of competition legal standard under Clayton
Section 7 is not precisely the same as a rule of reason analysis as applied by
the courts under the Sherman Act. However, from an economic standpoint,
the analysis of mergers illustrates the confusion that results from not knowing
which welfare standard to use. This analysis of merger efficiencies is also
applicable to joint ventures. Unlike mergers, joint ventures are governed by
Sherman Section 1 and hence a rule of reason analysis.56
In many antitrust cases, because consumer welfare and total welfare move
in the same direction, the outcome of a rule of reason analysis will be the
same regardless of what standard is used.57 We focus our analysis primarily on
merger-specific cases analyzed under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, where the
analysis is similar to the rule of reason, and where the outcome of the substan-
tive analysis may be different depending on whether a consumer welfare or
total welfare standard is used.
In this section, we examine the Williamson trade-off that takes place when
merger-specific efficiencies are accompanied by an increase in monopoly
power. There are some instances in which a business practice improves effi-
ciency, i.e., reduces costs of production and/or distribution. If the practice
does not enhance market power, the cost savings will be passed on to some
extent to consumers in the form of lower prices.58 In these cases, there is no
complication, and the antitrust policy should be one of benign neglect since
54 Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-Offs, 58 AM.
ECON. REV. 18 (1968).
55 BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 9, at 107–10 (suggesting that Williamson’s trade-
off may illustrate all antitrust issues).
56 See 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1910–12 (2d. ed. 2005).
57 The standard models of monopoly and monopsony are available in most microeconomics
textbooks. See, e.g., JEFFREY PERLOFF, MICROECONOMICS 353–59, 533–39 (6th ed. 2011).
58 In the extreme case, where the market is perfectly competitive, the firm will not pass on any
firm-specific efficiency.
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both consumer welfare and total welfare are increased by the business
practice.
In some instances, however, the merger-specific efficiency is accompanied
by enhanced market power. This may still result in greater output and lower
prices and, therefore, could increase both consumer welfare and total welfare.
The complication arises when there is a cost reduction due to the efficiency
accompanied by an increase in market power that leads to a price increase
above the previous level. This situation creates a need to weigh the benefits of
improved efficiency against the costs of allocative inefficiency. The same
analysis applies to all joint ventures and agreements that are necessary to real-
ize the efficiency.
A. EFFICIENCY-ENHANCING JOINT VENTURES AND MERGERS
AMONG SELLERS
The trade-off analyzed by Williamson illustrates the complications that
may accompany efficiency-enhancing agreements, joint ventures, and hori-
zontal mergers.59 In Figure 1, the pre-agreement price and quantity, P1 and Q1,
respectively, are determined by the equality of demand (D) and the competi-
tive supply, which is shown as MC1 = AC1. The model assumes that industry
marginal cost (MC1) and average cost (AC1) are constant. The joint venture
increases efficiency, as reflected in the decrease in costs from MC1 = AC1 to
MC2 = AC2. If market power does not increase as a result of the joint venture,
the cost savings will be passed on to consumers.60 The price will fall to P2 and
the quantity consumed will rise from Q1 to Q2. In this case, the joint venture
raises no antitrust policy concerns since the welfare effects are unambiguously
positive: both consumer welfare and total welfare increase.
Complications arise when market power increases due to an efficiency-en-
hancing joint venture or merger. In Figure 1, suppose that the joint venture
leads to the same cost savings, but that the exercise of the resulting market
power leads to an increase in price from P1 to P3 with a corresponding de-
crease in quantity from Q1 to Q3. From the consumer’s perspective, the trans-
action appears to be clearly undesirable. The price paid rises and the
consumer does not appear to enjoy any of the benefits from the cost reduction.
The allocative inefficiency flowing from the exercise of market power causes
consumer surplus to fall from area acP1 to area abP3. If the lawfulness of the
59 William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 652
(1983) (addressing a similar problem when a horizontal price-fixing cartel reduces transaction
costs while increasing price).
60 Due to the perfectly elastic competitive supply curve, all of the cost saving is passed on to
consumers when the market remains competitive. If the supply curve were positively sloped, not
all of the cost saving would be passed on, but output would still rise, and price would still fall.
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FIGURE 1: EFFICIENCY-ENHANCING JOINT VENTURES
AND MERGERS
agreement, joint venture, or merger is determined solely on the basis of con-
sumer welfare in this market, it would be unlawful. If one looks at this joint
venture from a total welfare perspective, however, there are two important
observations worth making. First, whether total welfare rises or falls depends
on the relative magnitudes of the allocative inefficiency and the cost saving.
In Figure 1, the allocative inefficiency is given by the triangular area bcd. The
profit to the sellers is equal to the rectangle P3beP2. Part of this, area P3bdP1, is
a transfer from consumers to producers, and the remainder, the rectangle
P1deP2, represents the cost savings. As Figure 1 is drawn, the cost saving
appears to be larger than the allocative inefficiency. In that event, the joint
venture should not be barred on total welfare grounds because the benefits of
the cost saving outweigh the allocative inefficiency. The merger is Kaldor-
Hicks efficient because the winners (the producers) could compensate the
losers (the consumers) and still be better off.61
But this need not always be the case. When the allocative inefficiency out-
weighs the cost saving, the joint venture reduces both consumer welfare and
61 See THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 1–7 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency); JUST ET AL., WELFARE ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 32–38 (same).
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total welfare. The joint venture is inefficient on the Kaldor-Hicks criterion
because the winners cannot profitably compensate the losers. Such a joint
venture or merger should be forbidden. Since we cannot presume that the net
effect of an efficiency-enhancing agreement among rival sellers will inevita-
bly be positive or negative, we need reliable estimates of the cost savings as
well as of the allocative inefficiency. This is particularly daunting for pro-
posed mergers because both estimates are needed before the merger is actu-
ally consummated.
Merger simulations have proven useful in many instances.62 But merger
simulations do not appear to be well-equipped to deal with the problem at
hand.63 The typical merger simulation predicts price effects before a merger
has actually occurred. These simulations, however, use estimated demand
elasticities and assumptions about the conduct of the firms to back out calcu-
lations of a firm’s marginal cost. This makes it difficult to incorporate the cost
savings and measure the potential allocative inefficiency. It is difficult for the
analyst to estimate the cost savings a merged firm is apt to realize without
very detailed cost data and very specialized institutional knowledge. Without
specific cost estimates, merger simulation does not address the effect of effi-
ciency. Moreover, estimating the potential allocative inefficiency is compli-
cated by the fact that a firm’s post-merger conduct may differ substantially
from its pre-merger conduct. Consequently, it is doubtful that merger simula-
tions are the answer.
There is a second observation regarding the cost savings that should be
made. Even if one’s focus is solely on consumer welfare, the cost savings
benefit consumers generally. These cost savings do, of course, improve the
profits of the sellers in this market. But it would be a mistake to dismiss these
cost savings as of no consequence to consumers.64 The sellers’ costs fall be-
cause fewer of society’s scarce resources are needed to produce the output
62 Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Simulation as an Alternative to Structural Merger
Policy in Differentiated Products Industries, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE ANTITRUST PROCESS
(Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit eds., 1996).
63 Gregory J. Werden, Simulating the Effects of Differentiated Products Mergers: A Practi-
tioners’ Guide, in STRATEGY AND POLICY IN THE FOOD SYSTEM: EMERGING ISSUES 95–110 (Julie
A. Caswell & Ronald W. Cotterill eds., 1996); Oliver Budzinski & Arndt Christiansen, The
Oracle/PeopleSoft Case: Unilateral Effects, Simulation Models and Econometrics in Contempo-
rary Merger Control, 34 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 133 (2007); Dennis W. Carlton,
The Relevance for Antitrust Policy of Theoretical and Empirical Advances in Industrial Organi-
zation, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 47 (2003); Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, The Effects of
Mergers in Differentiated Product Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy, 10 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 407 (1994).
64 We are not counting the cost savings twice. One may dismiss them as beneficial to the
sellers, but they should be considered for their benefits to consumers.
2012] RULE OF REASON AND THE GOALS OF ANTITRUST 485
being sold.65 These resources are then available to produce goods and services
in other markets. The consumer benefits flowing from these cost savings may
be diffused throughout the economy, but they exist nonetheless.66
B. SOME NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
The following numerical examples are purely hypothetical. These examples
are intended to illustrate the relationship between cost savings and changes in
welfare. First, we show that a cost saving can offset a fairly large price in-
crease. Second, we illustrate how large a cost saving would have to be to
prevent a price increase that would reduce consumer welfare. The third exam-
ple illustrates the importance of the pre-merger or pre-agreement market
structure. Finally, the fourth example illustrates the necessary cost efficiencies
for joint ventures or mergers that fall short of monopoly.
Example 1: Suppose that the demand is given by P = 100 − 0.001Q and that
the pre-merger marginal and average costs are constant and equal to 25. The
competitive solution involves a price of 25 and a quantity of 75,000. In this
case, consumer surplus is equal to 1/2 ×(75)×(75,000), which is 2,812,500. Pro-
ducer surplus is zero because price is equal to average cost.
Now, suppose that there is a merger to monopoly that reduces average and
marginal cost to 10. Profit maximization by the monopolist leads to a price of
55, which is an increase of 30. The quantity falls to 45,000, which is a de-
crease of 30,000.67 At the monopoly solution, the consumer surplus is
1/2 ×(45)×(45,000), which is 1,012,500. Profit for the monopolist would then
be (45)×(45,000), which equals 2,025,000. The sum of consumer surplus and
profit is 3,037,500, which is larger than the pre-merger consumer surplus.
Consequently, the merger is Kaldor-Hicks efficient, because the winner (the
monopolist) could compensate the loser (consumers) and still have profits
left over. It is also instructive to note that allocative inefficiency is
1/2 ×(55 − 25)×(75,000 − 45,000), which is 450,000, while the cost saving is
(25 − 10)×(45,000), which is 675,000. Even though the price increase was
twice the cost saving, total welfare increased.68
65 We are not referring to the resources not being used because output has been reduced from
Q1 to Q3. We are instead referring to the resources now needed to produce Q3.
66 Paul A. Pautler, The Effects of Mergers and Post-merger Integration: A Review of Business
Consulting Literature (Jan. 21, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/rt/businesreviewpaper
.pdf (surveying the literature on efficiencies).
67 The monopolist will produce where marginal revenue equals marginal cost:
100 − 0.002Q = 10, which yields Q = 45,000. Substitution into the demand function yields a
price of 55.
68 The hypothetical cost savings amounted to 60 percent of the pre-merger cost. This, of
course, is enormous, but the point is that the merger to monopoly can be socially beneficial.
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Example 2: In the second example, we focus on consumer welfare rather
than total welfare in order to get a sense of how large a cost reduction must be
to cause no harm to consumers in the face of a joint venture or merger to
monopoly. Suppose that consumer demand can be written as the following
linear function, P = 100 – 0.1Q, where P and Q represent price and quantity,
respectively, and marginal cost prior to the merger or joint venture is equal to
40. If there are two firms that behave as Cournot duopolists,69 the price will be
60, and the quantity consumed will be 400.70 If the two firms form a joint
venture or merge to monopoly, marginal cost must fall from 40 to 20 to pre-
vent a price increase.71 Thus, a 50 percent reduction in marginal cost is needed
to avoid a reduction in consumer welfare as measured by consumer surplus.
Example 3: This example illustrates that merging to monopoly is apt to
require substantial—perhaps even extraordinary—economies to offset the
consequences of the increase in monopoly power.72 As the pre-agreement
market structure moves closer to a competitive market structure, the cost re-
duction necessary to avoid consumer harm grows substantially. For three
Cournot rivals, the necessary decrease in marginal cost is 75 percent.73 For
four Cournot rivals, it would be 90 percent. For a pre-agreement market struc-
ture with five Cournot rivals, marginal cost would have to fall to zero to avoid
any harm to consumers. The actual efficiency that an agreement, joint venture,
or merger would generate will vary from case to case.
Example 4: The examples above all involve a change in market structure
that results in a complete monopoly. Less extreme consolidations will not
demand such substantial cost efficiencies to avoid consumer harm. Suppose
that there were five Cournot rivals prior to the joint venture or merger. Given
the same demand and cost conditions, price would be 50 and output would be
500. If an agreement, joint venture, or merger resulted in four Cournot com-
petitors, the cost reduction would only have to be 2.5, which is only a 6.25
69 Cournot duopolists compete by setting their quantities and letting price be determined by
demand. PERLOFF, supra note 57, at 447.
70 It can be shown that the Cournot duopoly output will be 2/3 of the competitive output. Given
the demand and cost assumptions, the competitive output is 600. Price in the Cournot duopoly
example is determined by substituting Q = 400 into the demand function. Id. at 452.
71 To show this, we solve for consumer surplus in the pre-merger period. CS1= 1/2 ×(100 −
60)×400 = 8,000. Then, we compare this to the post-merger calculation of consumer surplus,
CS2= 1/2 ×(100 − MC)2/0.4. Setting CS1 = CS2, we can solve for the value of MC that will leave
consumer surplus unchanged. 1/2 ×(100 − MC)2/0.4 = 8,000. Therefore, MC = 20 will leave con-
sumer surplus the same.
72 In fact, there has never been a decided merger case that explores what kind of extraordinary
efficiencies might be contemplated, as articulated in FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708,
720–22 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
73 In this case, pre-agreement output would be Q = 3/4 ×(600) = 450. Now, we solve:
100 − (0.2×450) = MC. The solution to this equation is 10, or 25 percent of 40.
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percent reduction.74 In the real world, this may still be a substantial efficiency
gain, but it is far less than the efficiencies necessary to justify monopoly.
C. EFFICIENCY-ENHANCING JOINT VENTURES AND MERGERS
AMONG BUYERS
A similar analysis applies to efficiency-enhancing agreements, joint ven-
tures, and mergers among buyers.75 When formerly competing buyers merge,
concentration on the buying side of the relevant market necessarily increases,
with the extent of the increase depending on the relative sizes of the merging
firms.76 If the merger yields merger-specific efficiencies, one of three things is
likely to happen. First, if the market is unconcentrated before and after the
merger, this sort of merger poses no antitrust concerns. Given the pre-merger
and post-merger market structure, this merger would not attract much atten-
tion from the antitrust enforcement agencies.
Second, the merger could alter the market structure in such a way that non-
competitive pricing would occur, but the post-merger price would still be
above the pre-merger price due to substantial efficiencies. In this case, the
efficiencies cause the derived demand to shift enough so that the post-merger
monopsony price exceeds the pre-merger competitive price. If these efficien-
cies are merger-specific, then the merger should still be applauded because
suppliers benefit from higher prices and greater sales. The fact that prices are
below the new competitive level is bothersome, but suppliers are still better
off on balance. By assumption, the efficiencies are not obtainable without the
merger, so society is better off with the merger than without it.
The third and most interesting possibility involves the Williamson trade-off
as adapted to monopsony. In this case, merger-specific efficiencies reduce the
transaction costs of the buyers, but the increase in market concentration is
sufficient to produce a price and quantity below the pre-merger level.
More specifically, we are considering the situation in which the buyers
purchase an intermediate good that is used to produce a final good. The de-
74 To avoid consumer harm, 4/5 of the competitive output must be 500. Thus, the pre-agreement
competitive output must be 4/5Q = 500 or Q equal to 625. Thus, we solve 100 − (0.1×625) = MC,
or MC equal to 37.5. The reduction in cost would then only have to be 2.5, which is 6.25 percent
of 40. In this example we assume that all of the firms realize the same efficiencies. In the event
that only the merging firms realize the efficiencies, the analysis will necessarily be somewhat
different.
75 The same analysis also applies to cooperative buying groups. See Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey
L. Harrison, Cooperative Buying, Monopsony Power, and Antitrust Policy, 86 NW. U. L. REV.
331 (1992).
76 When two firms merge, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is the sum of the
squared market shares of the firms in an industry, increases by twice the product of their pre-
merger market shares. For example, if a firm with a 10 percent share merged with a firm holding
a 5 percent share, the HHI would rise by 2(10)(5)=100.
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mand for the intermediate good is derived from the consumer demand for the
final good.77 If the cost of transforming the intermediate good into a final
good falls, then the derived demand will shift to the right, i.e., the intermedi-
ate good becomes more valuable to the buyers. In this case, transactional effi-
ciencies lead to a shift in the derived demand for the intermediate good in
question. The economic effects are illustrated in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2: EFFICIENCY TRADE-OFFS BY BUYERS
The pre-merger price (P1) and quantity (Q1) are determined by the equality
of derived demand (D1) and supply (S). The efficiencies resulting from the
merger of buyers lead to a shift in the derived demand from D1 to D2. If the
merger of formerly competing buyers confers no monopsony power, then the
quantity will expand to Q2 due to the increased value of the intermediate good.
Due to the positively-sloped supply, price rises from P1 to P2. In this case,
everyone is a winner as buyer surplus and producer surplus both increase.78 As
77 For a graphical analysis of derived demand, see ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN,
ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 321–23 n.65 (2d ed. 2008).
78 We refer to buyer surplus rather than consumer surplus because the buyers of the intermedi-
ate good are firms. The concept is the same.
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a result, total welfare rises. Such mergers obviously should be permitted as
they pose no competitive threats.
If, however, the efficiency-enhancing merger results in monopsony power,
the quantity purchased will be determined by the equality of the marginal
factor cost (MFC) and the derived demand (D2).79 In Figure 2, the profit maxi-
mizing quantity falls from Q1 to Q3 and the price also falls from P1 to P3. As a
result, there is a welfare loss due to allocative inefficiency as well as enhanced
buyer surplus that flows from the efficiency.80 To be sure, there will be an
increase in buyer surplus that is simply a transfer from producers. But there is
additional buyer surplus that results from the efficiency. It is only the latter
that should be compared to the allocative inefficiency in evaluating the impact
on total welfare.
If the lawfulness of this merger depends solely on its impact on the compet-
itive suppliers, then the merger would be unlawful due to the reduction in
producer surplus from the pre-merger area P1dg to the post-merger area P3cg.
On total welfare grounds, however, the allocative inefficiency captured by the
triangular area edc must be compared to the reduction in cost captured by the
area between the two derived demand curves, i.e., area abef. If the cost sav-
ings outweigh the allocative inefficiency, then the merger should be allowed;
otherwise, it should not.
In the event that the reduction in transaction costs outweighs the allocative
inefficiency, the merger should be permitted. The merger is Kaldor-Hicks ef-
ficient because the winners (the buyers) could compensate the losers (the sup-
pliers) and still be better off. But this need not always be the case. When the
allocative inefficiency outweighs the cost saving, the merger reduces both
producer welfare and total welfare. The merger is inefficient on the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion because the winners cannot profitably compensate the losers.
Such a merger should be forbidden. Since we cannot presume that the net
effect of an efficiency-enhancing merger of rival buyers will inevitably be
positive or negative, we need reliable estimates of the prospective cost savings
and the prospective allocative inefficiency. This is again a particularly daunt-
ing requirement because both estimates are needed before the merger is actu-
ally approved.81 Mergers that have already been consummated can, of course,
79 For a compact development of the theory of monopsony, see Roger D. Blair & Christine
Piette Durrance, The Economics of Monopsony, in 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ISSUES
IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 393 (W. Dale Collins ed., 2008).
80 It is possible for the derived demand to shift enough for the post-merger quantity to increase
in spite of the monopsony power. In this event, producer surplus would increase even though
there would be some allocative inefficiency. This is the second possible outcome of a merger that
was described earlier (in which prices rise but not all the way to the competitive level).
81 This is even more complicated when the merger stops short of monopsony. In that event,
the merged firm experiences cost savings while its rivals do not, but all buyers realize price
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be challenged after the fact. In that event, proof of the cost saving will be
possible—at least in principle—but estimating the allocative inefficiency will
be no easy task.
D. MERGER LAW AND EFFICIENCIES—WHICH STANDARD?
Williamson’s analysis of mergers allows for an exploration of how the U.S.
antitrust agencies and courts view merger efficiencies in the law. Cost savings
that result from merger-specific productive efficiencies that do more than in-
crease the merging parties’ profits are important. Since resources are freed up,
consumers benefit from lower prices in other markets. Yet, this is not always
clear in the law.82 As the previous examples suggest, a merger may generate
merger-specific efficiencies that do not result in a lower price but do improve
total welfare because of the savings in production costs.
For the most part, the treatment of efficiencies in the 2010 Merger Guide-
lines remains unchanged from the 1992/1997 version.83 Both the 1992/1997
and the 2010 Merger Guidelines have discussed the Williamson trade-off as
part of what they term a “sliding scale” approach for efficiencies analysis. The
2010 Merger Guidelines, in particular, make it clear that a consumer welfare
standard is employed when analyzing short-term effects. The Guidelines state,
“The greater the potential adverse competitive effect of a merger, the greater
must be the cognizable efficiencies, and the more they must be passed through
to consumers, for the Agencies to conclude that the merger will not have an
anticompetitive effect in the relevant market.”84 The 2010 Merger Guidelines
explain the sliding scale’s use of consumer welfare as follows: “In adhering to
this approach, the Agencies are mindful that the antitrust laws give competi-
tion, not internal operational efficiency, primacy in protecting customers.”85
decreases and higher profits. The other firms would appear to have an incentive to merge to
realize similar cost savings. This could result in further decreases in price and further antitrust
enforcement issues. Moreover, if the merger turns out to be unlawful, the remedy may involve
“unscrambling the eggs.”
82 In the case law, the impact of efficiencies has suggested an exclusive focus on consumer
welfare over total welfare. This is true not merely in the merger arena but across antitrust cases.
Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice, supra note 13, at 11 (“[I]f the evidence in a particular case
indicates that a challenged practice facilitates the exercise of market power, resulting in output
that is actually lower and prices that are actually higher, then tribunals uniformly condemn the
restraint without regard to offsetting efficiencies. Indeed, I have not been able to find a single
appellate decision that made a fact finding that a challenged practice resulted in lower market
wide output and higher prices, but that also went on to approve the restraint because proven
efficiencies exceeded consumer losses.”).
83 D. Daniel Sokol & James A. Fishkin, Antitrust Merger Efficiencies in the Shadow of the
Law, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 45, 55–56 (2011).
84 U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 10 (2010),
available at http://ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf.
85 Id.
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This is not to suggest that the 2010 Merger Guidelines wholly embrace a
consumer welfare standard. There is also language in the 2010 Merger Guide-
lines that suggests the possibility of a total welfare standard.86 To date, how-
ever, no case has cited to this particular sentence to justify efficiencies.
There are some caveats to analyzing decided merger cases. Litigated cases
involving merger efficiency claims are not reflective of all merger matters.87
Many litigated cases that include efficiencies discussions are preliminary in-
junction cases, rather than cases decided by a trial on the merits.88 But the
litigated merger cases impact what happens in negotiations between the merg-
ing parties and the agencies in the shadow of the law.89 The cases that have
been litigated that include an efficiency discussion have dicta that strongly
suggest a consumer welfare standard for merger review.90 The courts have
adopted the thinking and language of the 1992/1997 Merger Guidelines. This
is true of the efficiencies section of the Guidelines.91
86 Id. § 10 n.15 (“The Agencies also may consider the effects of cognizable efficiencies with
no short-term, direct effect on prices in the relevant market.”).
87 Sokol & Fishkin, supra note 83, at 47–51; Robert Pitofsky, Panel on Efficiencies/Dynamic
Analysis/Integrated Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of Justice/Federal Trade Comm’n Merger Enforcement
Workshop 82–83 (Feb. 19, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/mergerenforce/040219ftc-
trans.pdf (“Incidentally, there was a comment that courts almost never say [a merger is] illegal,
but because of the efficiencies, I’ll make it—I’ll call it legal. I believe the reason for that is the
agency doesn’t bring cases that are barely illegal but with substantial efficiencies. And therefore,
the courts haven’t had a shot at this, and I’m not sure they’re going to get a shot very soon,
because the agencies are very sensitive to claims of efficiency.”).
88 Nor do litigated cases address consent decrees, deals that get approved within the first thirty
days, or after a second request without a consent order.
89 Sokol & Fishkin, supra note 83, at 45. This is particularly true as there have not been any
litigated cases that are close such that efficiency claims could overcome the agencies’ alleged
anticompetitive effects. Id. at 52.
90 FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 153 (D.D.C. 2004) (“The existence of such
efficiencies, therefore, remains relevant to an assessment of the post-merger market and the po-
tential benefits to consumers from cost reductions and increased competition.”); FTC v. Cardinal
Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 62 (D.D.C. 1998) (“[T]he FTC does not contest that the mergers
will result in large-scale efficiencies, some of which will be passed on to the consumer . . . .”);
FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1091 (D.D.C. 1997) (“The Court has no doubt that a
portion of any efficiencies achieved through a merger of the defendants would be passed on to
customers.”); United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 136–37
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (“In sum, to sustain an ‘efficiencies defense,’ the defendants must clearly
demonstrate that the proposed merger itself will create a net economic benefit for the health care
consumer.”).
91 See William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of
Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 232 (2003)
(“The courts have largely adopted the analytical framework for evaluating efficiency claims that
is set out in the Guidelines.”); see also Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role
of Merger Guidelines in Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771 (2006) (describing
the adoption of the merger guidelines by courts); D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions and
Merger Control, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1055, 1106–09 (2010).
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The one case in which efficiencies played a central role was FTC v. H.J.
Heinz Co., a three-to-two merger involving baby food.92 In that case, the court
discussed the need for “extraordinary efficiencies” (although what might con-
stitute “extraordinary efficiencies” is not made clear). However, in doing so,
the court did not distinguish which standard might be at play. Indeed, the
lower court decision cited by the Heinz court in dicta, University Health,
states that “a defendant who seeks to overcome a presumption that a proposed
acquisition would substantially lessen competition must demonstrate that the
intended acquisition would result in significant economies and that these
economies ultimately would benefit competition and, hence, consumers.”93
The problem with this dicta is that what might benefit competition (total wel-
fare) may be at odds in some set of cases with what might benefit consumers
(consumer welfare). On this point, the Heinz court and the agencies are silent.
III. COUNTERVAILING POWER AND ECONOMIC WELFARE 94
In this section, we examine the somewhat misunderstood case of bilateral
monopoly. Mergers (or agreements) that convert monopoly (or monopsony) to
bilateral monopoly are welfare-enhancing. This poses serious problems for
antitrust policy. This analysis is somewhat tricky because monopoly (or mo-
nopsony) in response to lawful monopsony (or monopoly) leads to welfare
gains. The impact on transaction prices is actually irrelevant in this setting,
and that may need more careful explanation.
Agreements among ostensibly competing sellers on price and output are
usually unlawful per se. Typically, the formation of cartels is intended to emu-
late monopoly with its attendant welfare losses, which warrants harsh treat-
ment.95 The ultimate “agreement” is a merger of the competing sellers. But
merging to monopoly would seem to fly in the face of Section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act, which forbids mergers that may substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in the relevant market. In the absence of the effi-
ciencies considered in the preceding section, this appears to be a sound pro-
phylactic rule as it prevents the deterioration of market structure that would
lead to both consumer welfare losses and total welfare losses. But that is not
always the case because the buying side of the market may not be competi-
tively structured. When competitive sellers are confronted by a lawful monop-
sony, merger to monopoly creates a bilateral monopoly, which is a market
92 FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
93 FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991), cited by Heinz, 246 F.3d
at 720.
94 See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTER-
VAILING POWER (1952) (providing an early discussion of countervailing power).
95 D. Daniel Sokol, Cartels, Corporate Compliance and What Practitioners Really Think
About Enforcement, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 201 (2012).
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with one buyer and one seller.96 The same, of course, is true for a cartel that
forms in response to monopsony. Bilateral monopoly has superior welfare
properties relative to the prior market structure.97 In this event, such an agree-
ment or a merger should survive a rule of reason analysis because there is a
total welfare improvement. This case, however, demands some careful
analysis.98
A. AGREEMENTS AND MERGERS AMONG SELLERS
The economic consequences of an agreement or a merger among former
competitors in response to monopsony can be analyzed by referring to Figure
3. We begin with a monopsonist buying from a competitive industry.99 The
adverse welfare effects of monopsony can be seen in Figure 3.
Under competitive conditions, demand (D) and supply (S) determine a
price of w1, and a quantity of Q1.100 Buyer surplus101 is equal to area abw1,
while producer surplus equals area w1bc. The sum, area abc, is total welfare.
In contrast, suppose there is a single buyer, that is, a monopsonist. The
monopsonist can take advantage of the positively sloped supply curve by re-
stricting its purchases and thereby depressing the price that it pays. To maxi-
mize its profits, the monopsonist will purchase at the point where the marginal
factor cost (MFC) equals demand.102 At this reduced quantity (Q2), the price
96 This term does not refer to the case of a monopolist in the output market that is a monop-
sonist in an input market.
97 The correct analysis of bilateral monopoly can be traced at least to A.L. Bowley, Bilateral
Monopoly, 25 ECON. J. 651 (1928). Most microeconomic textbooks compare the monopoly solu-
tion and the monopsony solution and then argue that the bilateral monopoly solution is indeter-
minate. Specifically, they argue that the price would fall between the monopoly and monopsony
level as would the quantity, but they do not state by how much. This is wrong. Blair, Kaserman,
and Romano note instead that the quantity is determinate, but that the price is indeterminate.
Roger D. Blair, David L. Kaserman & Richard E. Romano, A Pedagogical Treatment of Bilat-
eral Monopoly, 55 S. ECON. J. 831 (1989).
98 See Richard Friedman, Antitrust Analysis and Bilateral Monopoly, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 873
(1986).
99 The case of a monopolist selling to competitive buyers has precisely the same antitrust
significance. The analysis is symmetric.
100 We use P for output prices and W for input prices.
101 We are using the term “buyer surplus” because in most monopsony settings the buyers are
firms rather than consumers. The concept, however, is the same and it represents the difference
between willingness to pay and the price actually paid.
102 The profit function for a firm with monopsony power in the market for one input, say x1,
can be written as:
, where P is output price, Q(x1, x2) is the production function,
and w1 and x1 are the price and quantity of xi. The first-order condition for profit maximization of
interest is:
.
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on the supply curve is w2. The result is a reduction in producer surplus from
w1bc to w2ec. Part of this reduction, area w1few2, is converted into buyer sur-
plus, and part of it is lost. The net effect on total welfare is a loss equal to
triangular area dbe.103 Thus, the welfare results of monopsony are analogous
to those of monopoly. An unlawful monopsonist reduces total welfare as well
as producer welfare. The analogous value to the consumer surplus is the re-
duction in producer surplus created by the buyer’s monopsony power.104
FIGURE 3: COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF BILATERAL MONOPOLY
The monopsony solution in Figure 3 involves a price of w2 and a quantity
of Q2. The sum of producer surplus and buyer surplus is equal to the area
The value of the marginal product, , is the demand for x1 while w1+ x1(dw/dx1) is the
marginal factor cost. Since dw1/dx1 is positive, MFC > w1.
103 Although it may be somewhat counterintuitive, the lower price paid by the monopsonist
does not result in lower output prices. See Blair & Durrance, supra note 79.
104 The Supreme Court has long understood this parallel. In Mandeville Island Farms v. Ameri-
can Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948), for example, sugar beet farmers complained that the
refiners colluded in an effort to depress the prices that they paid for the sugar beets. The Court
recognized that the sellers were the victims of the collusive monopsony.
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adec. When the sellers unite through an agreement or a merger, there is mo-
nopoly on the selling side and monopsony on the buying side of the market.
This is what is known as bilateral monopoly.105 The usual marginal analysis
fails us here. Neither the monopolist nor the monopsonist can exploit its mar-
ket power in the usual way.106 Normally, a monopolist exploits its power by
restricting its output, thereby raising price above the competitive level. The
monopsonist curtails its purchases and thereby reduces price below the com-
petitive level. It is clear that these efforts are in conflict. Unilateral efforts to
maximize profits will be futile. The solution is cooperation rather than con-
flict. The buyer and the seller will cooperate to maximize their profits.
It is clear from Figure 3 that the total surplus will be maximized by ex-
changing Q1 rather than Q2. The total surplus will be equal to the triangular
area abc. Since no other volume of output can generate more total surplus, no
other quantity makes economic sense. The parties will agree on that quantity
and then negotiate over the sharing of the resulting surplus. In a bilateral mo-
nopoly, the price is not a rationing device. In other words, it does not lead to
increases or decreases in the quantity supplied or purchased. The quantity (Q1)
is determined before the maximized surplus is split. The price is then just a
means of sharing the jointly maximized surplus. One price that does just that
is w1, but there are many other prices that can be used to split the surplus. In
the case of a merger of sellers that were previously being exploited by a
monopsonist, one would expect the price to rise. This price increase, however,
should be of no competitive concern because the price does not ration; it allo-
cates the surplus between the buyer and seller.
B. ANTITRUST POLICY ANALYSIS
The cartel agreement or merger to monopoly that creates a bilateral monop-
oly results in an increase in total surplus and, therefore, would seem to survive
a rule of reason test where the goal is total welfare. It is, of course, somewhat
disconcerting to endorse monopoly in order to create countervailing power
when monopsony is present. But here we began with a lawful monopsony.
From the perspective of total welfare, a horizontal agreement or a merger to
monopoly is desirable.107
105 See, e.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 370–71 (1933) (describ-
ing a bilateral monopoly involving bituminous coal producers who created an exclusive joint
selling agency for what the coal producers agreed would be the best possible price).
106 Technically, the monopolist has no supply function, so the monopsonist cannot move along
what is not there. Similarly, the monopsonist has no demand function, so the monopolist cannot
move along what is not there. See JAMES M. HENDERSON & RICHARD E. QUANDT,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 222–26 (3d ed. 1980).
107 This issue is controversial, to say the least. See Tom Campbell, Bilateral Monopoly in
Mergers, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 521 (2007) (arguing in favor of such mergers). But see Jonathan B.
Baker, Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Merger to Monopoly to Serve a Single Buyer: Comment,
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If the goal being pursued is consumer welfare, or in other settings producer
welfare, then whether the agreement or the merger to monopoly (or monop-
sony) passes a rule of reason test does not depend on the consumer price.
What matters is the impact on consumer (or producer) surplus. In the case we
have analyzed, producers joined together to offset monopsony power, which
was presumed to be lawful. Whether the action of the producers is reasonable
depends on what happens to consumer surplus. If it rises or remains un-
changed, then the producers’ behavior is reasonable. If it falls, then that be-
havior is unreasonable on this standard even though the impact on total
welfare is positive. On an a priori basis, the effect on consumer surplus is
uncertain because the precise split of the total surplus is indeterminate.
Once the bilateral monopoly structure is in place, the parties rationally
agree to the quantity that maximizes total surplus. There are two boundary
cases in the subsequent negotiation over price. At one extreme, the price will
be so high that the monopolist extracts the entire surplus. At the other ex-
treme, the price is so low that the monopsonist extracts the entire surplus. Any
price between these extremes will divide the surplus between the buyer and
seller. Any of these prices is a possible solution and, therefore, the effect on
buyer surplus or producer surplus is indeterminate.
The change from the monopsony structure to bilateral monopoly is Kaldor-
Hicks efficient since the total surplus rises. The sellers join forces through an
agreement or a merger to improve producer surplus. This necessarily requires
an increase in price, but consumer surplus can rise even at a higher price. Due
to the increase in total surplus, both producer surplus and consumer surplus
may rise. This, of course, makes a rule of reason inquiry focused on a con-
sumer surplus standard difficult.
C. PHYSICIAN COOPERATIVE BARGAINING
As we have seen above, cooperative efforts that stop far short of an actual
merger to monopoly may yield total welfare gains if they create a bilateral
monopoly. Such gains may result when, for example, health care providers
bargain cooperatively with health insurers.108 Notwithstanding these potential
efficiency gains, cooperation among health care providers to bargain with
health insurers over reimbursement rates has been condemned as a violation
of Section 1 by the FTC.
75 ANTITRUST L.J. 637 (2008) (strongly disagreeing with Campbell). For a general discussion of
the role of countervailing buyer power in merger analysis, see John B. Kirkwood, Powerful
Buyers and Merger Enforcement, 92 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
108 See Roger D. Blair & Kristine L. Coffin, Physician Collective Bargaining: State Legislation
and the State Action Doctrine, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1731 (2005); Roger D. Blair & Jill Boylston
Herndon, Physician Cooperative Bargaining Ventures: An Economic Analysis, 71 ANTITRUST
L.J. 989 (2004).
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For example, when hospitals and primary care physicians in southwestern
Minnesota joined forces through the Minnesota Rural Health Cooperative
(MRHC) to negotiate reimbursement rates with (possibly powerful) health in-
surers, the FTC filed suit.109 The parties entered into a consent order on June
18, 2010, which prohibits the members of the MRHC from continuing their
joint efforts. Faced with repeated challenges and recognizing their potential
antitrust liability, physicians have appealed to both federal and state legisla-
tures for an antitrust exemption. Federal efforts have failed so far, but there
has been some success at the state level. The FTC has advised against such
legislation and remains skeptical that monopsony power actually exists.110
D. A CAVEAT ON COUNTERVAILING POWER
This analysis cannot be extended too far. For example, one might use this
analysis to argue in favor of collusion among sellers to offset collusion among
buyers. The theoretical argument still holds, but the obvious antitrust response
is to defeat the buyer cartel. The case against merger to monopoly to defeat a
buyer cartel is even stronger because the monopoly would be permanent while
a buyer cartel may not be permanent.111 If a merger were permitted and the
buying cartel fell apart, we would then have the monopoly outcome with its
Kaldor-Hicks inefficiency and associated welfare losses.
IV. RESTRAINTS WITHOUT ALLOCATIVE INEFFICIENCY
In this section, we examine restraints that have purely distributional effects.
On total welfare grounds, they are unobjectionable, but they are clearly objec-
tionable on consumer welfare grounds. Condemnation of these practices can
only be justified if the correct standard is consumer welfare.
Some horizontal restraints are structured in such a way that there is no
allocative inefficiency—at least not immediately—but there is a substantial
distributive impact on the victims of the restraint. These restraints appear to
be welfare-neutral in a Kaldor-Hicks framework since the winners could com-
pensate the losers and not be worse off. At the same time, if the winners
actually compensated the losers, they would be no better off. The bottom line
is that the total surplus does not change—only the distribution of that surplus
changes. If the standard of unreasonableness relies on total welfare, these re-
straints would pass muster. On the basis of consumer welfare, however, these
restraints would fail. In this section, we illustrate this problem with all-or-
109 See Minn. Rural Health Coop., FTC Docket No. 05-0199 (Jan. 8, 2010). The FTC has
responded similarly in other cases. See, e.g., N. Tex. Specialty Physicians, FTC Docket No. 021-
0075 (Sept. 17, 2003); Mem’l Hermann Health Network, FTC Docket No. 031-0001 (Nov. 25,
2003).
110 BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 48, at 211.
111 Id.
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none offers, two-part pricing, and bid rigging in single-item English auctions.
In each case, the pricing would be permissible if done unilaterally, but would
be unlawful per se if it were the product of horizontal collusion.
A. ALL-OR-NONE OFFERS
In some circumstances, ostensible competitors can collude and impose all-
or-none offers.112 Here we examine the behavior of colluding sellers, but anal-
ogous results flow from collusion among buyers.113 In either case, there is no
allocative inefficiency because the solution involves the competitive output.
For a seller cartel, we illustrate this result in Figure 4.
The usual demand curve is represented by D and the associated marginal
revenue is represented by MR. Long-run supply (LRS) and long-run marginal
cost (LMC) are assumed to be constant.114 The competitive solution results in
a price of P1 and a quantity of Q1. In the cartel solution, price rises to P2 and
quantity falls to Q2. This behavior reduces, but does not completely eliminate,
consumer surplus. It also involves the usual allocative inefficiency, which is
measured as the deadweight welfare loss.115
If the cartel can make all-or-none offers, the choice available to consumers
is altered in a significant way.116 Normally, consumers observe the price and
can buy as much or as little as they want, which is why consumers buy Q1
when the price is P1 but only Q2 when the price is P2. In an all-or-none offer,
the seller offers to sell a specific quantity at a specific price. The buyer either
accepts that offer or buys nothing at all. It is in the buyer’s interest to accept
that offer provided that consumer surplus does not fall below zero.
In Figure 4, the cartel will offer to sell Q1 at a price of P2. The gain in
consumer surplus on the first Q2 units is just offset by the loss in consumer
surplus by having to buy an additional Q1 − Q2 units at the monopoly price.
That is, area abP2 is just equal to area bcd.
The result of this all-or-none offer is a price of P2, which is the usual mo-
nopoly price, and the competitive quantity Q1. There is no allocative ineffi-
112 See e.g., Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Soundview Tech., Inc., 157 F. Supp. 180, 184–88 (D. Conn.
2001).
113 See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 48, at 50–53 (analyzing buyer cartels); Jill Boylston
Herndon, Health Insurer Monopsony Power: The All-Or-None Case, 21 J. HEALTH ECON. 197
(2002) (analyzing buyer cartels in the health care sector).
114 Horizontal supply results from constant input prices and access by all firms to the same
production technology. Industry output then changes with the expansion or contraction in the
number of firms in the industry.
115 This welfare loss is captured by the triangle bde. See Part III (Fig. 3) above.
116 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 15–16 (1976) (analyzing the all-or-none demand
curve).
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ciency and, therefore, no total welfare loss. The effect is purely distributive.117
With competition, consumer surplus is equal to area adP1, but with carteliza-
tion that area becomes profit for the colluding sellers.
Price
   a 
  
 P1                                                                                                                      
  







FIGURE 4: ALL-OR-NONE OFFERS
B. TWO-PART PRICING118
Collusion among sellers can also lead to two-part pricing.119 In this case, the
buyer pays a lump-sum access fee and then can buy as much or as little as he
or she wants at a price (i.e., a user fee) equal to marginal cost, which would be
117 This is strictly true only when the cartel makes no mistake on its price and quantity offer. If
the offer leads to a quantity below Q1, there will be some allocative inefficiency. Over time, this
should be corrected because the cartel can earn more profits by getting to the competitive
quantity.
118 There are many examples of two-part pricing. Tennis clubs often have annual dues as well
as a charge for court time. Netflix has monthly fees and user fees equal to a marginal cost of
zero.
119 See Walter Y. Oi, A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse Monopoly,
85 Q.J. ECON. 77 (1971) (introducing the model). In the antitrust case law context, this is a
theory at play in FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001). See Gregory J. Werden,
Monopsony and the Sherman Act: Consumer Welfare in a New Light, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 707,
731 (2007) (analyzing the two-part pricing theory in Heinz).
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the competitive price.120 Again, there is no apparent allocative inefficiency.
This pricing strategy is illustrated in Figure 5.
FIGURE 5: TWO-PART PRICING
Demand of a consumer is given by D and the marginal cost of producing
the good is represented by MC. The competitive price would be equal to P1,
which is equal to marginal cost. The quantity consumed is Q1. The consumer
surplus is equal to the triangular area abP1 and producer surplus is equal to
zero.
If collusion permits two-part pricing, the sellers will be able to charge an
access fee equal to the consumer surplus (area abP1) and guarantee a user fee
equal to marginal cost. Thus, output remains at Q1 and the user fee is P1. The
120 This simple solution assumes that all consumers have identical demands. If they do not,
two-part pricing becomes much more complicated. The simple case is used here to illustrate rule
of reason problems.
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entire consumer surplus has been extracted through the access fee. There is no
allocative inefficiency since the competitive quantity is consumed. The impact
of the collusion is purely distributional since consumer surplus is now zero.
C. COLLUSION IN BIDDING
In an English auction, an item is offered for sale and potential buyers offer
ascending bids for the item. The final price is determined by the highest bid-
der.121 Collusion among buyers at an English auction can lead to a redistribu-
tion of surplus without any apparent allocative inefficiency.122 Suppose that a
single item is being sold at auction. If all bidders have common values, com-
petition among them will drive the price up to that value in an ascending-price
English auction. If the seller’s reserve price is below that common value, the
item will be sold and the seller will enjoy surplus equal to the difference
between the competitive price and the reserve price, which is the lowest price
that the seller accepts. Anything above the reserve price confers surplus on the
seller.
Collusion among bidders will lead to a price at or just barely above the
seller’s reserve price. The seller will still sell the item, but all (or nearly all) of
the surplus goes to the colluding buyers who share it in some fashion. In this
case, there is no allocative inefficiency, but there are dramatic distributive
consequences.123
D. ANTITRUST POLICY DILEMMA
The collusive practices we have examined in this section are per se viola-
tions of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. None of them is ancillary to a legiti-
121 There is an enormous theoretical literature on auctions. See, e.g., LOUIS PHLIPS, THE ECO-
NOMICS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION 89–121 (1988); Paul Klemperer, Auction Theory: A Guide
to the Literature, 13 J. ECON. SURVS. 227 (1999).
122 Robert C. Marshall & Leslie M. Marx, Inefficiency of Collusion at English Auctions, CON-
TRIB. THEORETICAL ECON. (2004); see also BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 48, at 50–53 (exam-
ining bidder cartels); Masaki Aoyagi, Bid Rotation and Collusion in Repeated Auctions, 112 J.
ECON. THEORY 79 (2003) (examining buyer collusion in the auction context); Robert C. Marshall
& Michael J. Meurer, Bidder Collusion and Antitrust Law: Refining the Analysis of Price Fixing
to Account for the Special Features of Auction Markets, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 83 (2004); R. Preston
McAfee & John McMillan, Bidding Rings, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 579 (1992); Marc S. Robinson,
Collusion and the Choice of Auction, 16 RAND J. ECON. 141, 143 (1985). For empirical papers
on auction collusion, see, e.g., Peter Cramton & Jesse A. Schwartz, Collusive Bidding: Lessons
from the FCC Spectrum Auctions, 17 J. REG. ECON. 229 (2000); and Rieko Ishii, Favour Ex-
change in Collusion: Empirical Study of Repeated Procurement Auctions in Japan, 27 INT’L J.
INDUS. ORG. 137 (2009).
123 The case law regarding collusion among bidders traces back to United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d as modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). In some
cases, there are social benefits to collusion among bidders in auctions. Marshall & Meurer, supra
note 122, at 99–100.
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mate business venture, which can provide antitrust shelter in some cases.124
Instead, each can be characterized as a “naked” restraint of trade. These prac-
tices are presumed to be unreasonable and, therefore, unlawful. But each prac-
tice involves no allocative inefficiency and, therefore, the practices are not
inefficient based on the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. On total welfare grounds,
there appears to be nothing to condemn. In fact, the conspirators could argue
with some justification that they have not restrained trade. After all, the com-
petitive quantity is transacted in each instance and, therefore, there is no total
welfare loss.
From the perspective of consumer welfare, these practices are easy to con-
demn. Collusion that permits all-or-none offers or two-part pricing leaves
consumers with no consumer surplus and clearly makes them worse off.
When the buyers collude to make all-or-none offers or to rig bids at auctions,
all producer surplus is removed. While there have been a number of courts
that have treated buyer side collusion differently because the harm does not
reach consumers, who receive lower prices,125 this treatment in the case law is
not uniform. When examining collusion among buyers, it is the consumers
that are colluding, so the court must examine the welfare of the sellers.126
In the cases considered above, a total welfare standard does not provide a
sufficient foundation for condemning these practices under a rule of reason
analysis. In these cases, unreasonableness and, therefore, unlawfulness must
be based on considerations of the distributive consequences of the restraints.
The case law in the United States has been silent on the appropriate welfare
standard in the context of mergers involving significant efficiencies, but also
corresponding increases in price. The welfare standard applied in Canada lies
somewhere between a consumer and a total welfare standard.127 In Superior
Propane, the Canadian Competition Tribunal undertook an analysis that
weighed both producer surplus and consumer surplus in a merger that resulted
124 See Gregory J. Werden, The Ancillary Restraints Doctrine After Dagher, 8 SEDONA CONF. J.
17 (2007) (examining the ancillary restraints doctrine).
125 See Hillary Greene, Non-Per Se Treatment of Buyer Price-Fixing in Intellectual Property
Settings, 2011 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 4, 13 (2011).
126 From Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., a monopsony case involv-
ing sugar beet farmers, we may infer that such collusive monopsony behavior would be con-
demned under a total welfare standard. 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948) (“The [Sherman Act] does not
confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers. Nor does it
immunize the outlawed acts because they are done by any of these.”).
127 Comm’r of Competition v. Superior Propane Inc., [2000] C.C.T.D. No. 15, 7 C.P.R. (4th)
385 (Can. Comp. Trib.) (original decision); [2001] 3 F.C. 185 (Fed. Ct. App.) (first Court of
Appeal decision), available at http://reports.fja.gc.ca/fc/2001/pub/v3/2001fc28500.html; [2002]
C.C.T.D. No. 10, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 417 (Can. Comp. Trib.) (redetermination); [2003] 3 F.C. 529
(Fed. Ct. App.) (second Court of Appeal decision), available at http://reports.fja.gc.ca/fc/2003/
pub/v3/2003fc31974.html.
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in an increase in price along with merger-based savings that resulted from
redundancies in management, back office, and staff.128
The way to undertake merger analysis that would incorporate a total wel-
fare approach in the United States would be to ex ante estimate the price
increase and demand function (the difference in prices and quantities, control-
ling for other things that cause changes). Companies relying upon a total wel-
fare analysis would need to show specific cost savings that are real and that
cannot be realized in the absence of the merger. In this situation there are
winners and losers. Under the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, if the winners (the pro-
ducers) can compensate the losers (the consumers), then the merger is welfare
enhancing and should be approved.129
While it might be possible for a party to use such a total welfare analysis
utilizing the language of Section 10 of the 2010 Merger Guidelines, in a liti-
gated case we think that case law will be slow to develop in this area. Few
mergers get litigated on the merits, due to issues, such as short financing win-
dows, the uncertainty that mergers create for employees of the target firm, the
benefits of settlement with the agencies via a consent decree, the risk appetite
of the acquirer, and the fact that many acquirers are concerned only about
their specific deal and not about creating good case law. As a result, to the
extent that agencies push to embrace total welfare explicitly, we believe that
this may occur by virtue of the decisions the antitrust agency makes regarding
whether or not to allow a merger.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the antitrust laws, reasonableness is what separates lawful from un-
lawful restraints or business conduct. If a business practice is reasonable, it is
lawful; if it is unreasonable, it is unlawful. Obviously, a crucial first step in
evaluating the reasonableness of a business practice is identifying a standard
of reasonableness. Since the Sherman Act’s text offers no guidance, we natu-
rally turn to the Supreme Court for instruction. As we found in Part II, how-
ever, the standard of reasonableness adopted by the Supreme Court is
ambiguous. Based on some recent opinions, one might conclude that the im-
pact on consumer welfare will dictate the result. But others might just as eas-
ily conclude that total welfare is the guide. From an economic perspective, we
advocate total welfare as the standard. It is essential for the Supreme Court to
128 See Thomas W. Ross & Ralph A. Winter, The Efficiency Defense in Merger Law: Economic
Foundations and Recent Canadian Developments, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 471, 487–94 (2005) (ex-
ploring the implications of this case and noting that the analysis undertaken was problematic in
many respects).
129 Under total welfare, the producers could compensate the consumers because with signifi-
cant enough cost savings, producers and consumers will still be better off even if Kaldor-Hicks
does not require it.
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clarify its standard for analysis if we are going to have logically consistent
and economically coherent outcomes.
In many substantive areas of antitrust, both standards yield the same out-
come, but there are complications in other areas. This article spells out some
of these complications and inconsistencies. A real policy dilemma arises in
analyzing cases that have severe distributive effects but involve no allocative
inefficiency. The economic analysis of these more complicated issues illus-
trates the difficulty that is caused by the absence of clear guidance from the
Supreme Court.
